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This thesis contains a qualitative analysis of the requirements for
field artillery models of combat. The field artillery system and the
artillery team along with the anatomy of combat are covered to familiarize
the analyst with the major components of the system to be modeled. The
treatment is presented from the modeling side in terms of desirable
characteristics to be included and pitfalls to be avoided in a combat
model and from the artillery viewpoint in terms of significant problems
that exist in the areas of fire direction, target acquisition, and weapons
evaluation. The analysis covers theoretical and working models of the
above areas, which are in agreement with established facts of warfare.
The conclusion reached is that future emphasis in combat modeling
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I. INTRODUCTION
A great part of information obtained in war is contradictory,
still a greater part is false, and by far the greatest part
somewhat doubtful. What is required of an officer in this
case is a certain power of discrimination, which only
knowledge of men and good judgement can give. The law of
probability must be his guide.
These words were written by Karl Von Clausewitz [Ref . 1] in 182 7
on the subject of warfare in that era . They take on added meaning and
become more significant when applied to the complexities of modern
combat. Man has traveled far along the road to improvement of his
capability to wage war successfully. Weapons systems have been
developed which are capable of destroying almost any known target.
Combat forces possess a degree of mobility that enables them to be
deployed anywhere in the world and tactics have been improved through
experiences on global battlefields. It is an obvious fact that modern
combat is a dynamic interaction of weapons, terrain, personnel and
tactics which are subject to change over time.
Tacticians and military analysts are constantly searching for ways
and means by which the intricacies of combat can be studied in a pre-
cise and reproducible manner . Experimental wars cannot be conducted
and combat cannot be reproduced in a laboratory. The long lead times
and exponential rising costs of developing weapon systems requires that
a thorough analysis be conducted and a strong probability of success be
given to a system prior to committing scarce resources.
The discipline of Operations Research has made a significant con-
tribution to the problem of analyzing present combat systems and
developing improved systems by the introduction of the concept of the
combat model. If the relevant characteristics of the situation can be
isolated by means of a model then the problem can be analyzed and per-
haps solutions or feasible areas for investigation can be identified which
will result in a great savings in time, manpower, money and material.
The model is not the ultimate answer to the analysis of warfare. It is
a tool which, if properly used, can be of great assistance to the
decision maker on whose course of action the outcome of future combat
may depend
.
The U.S. Army Field Artillery has realized the worth and unlimited
potential of the use of combat models in conducting investigation re-
garding fire direction, target acquisition, and weapons evaluation.
The purpose of this thesis is to present and discuss the requisite
characteristics of a valid field artillery model of combat and to illuminate
those areas of field artillery operations in which combat models play a
principal role in the problem solving process. A model of field artillery
combat is considered to be valid or good when it is an understandable
representation of reality using accepted mathematical techniques, with
the ability to make feasible predictions regarding the situation or
problem under analysis. This idea of a valid model combines the defi-
nitions of model validation and model verification as given by Dr. S.
Bonder in Ref . 2 .
A basic understanding of the field artillery system is an absolute
necessity before attempting to develop a combat model of any field
artillery operation. Such being the case, the major elements of the
field artillery system are presented in an attempt to familiarize the
reader with them.
The development of a new system in field artillery is an evolution-
ary process which most often proceeds along the path of a concept, to
a theoretical model, to a working model and then to field testing or
implementation in the hands of the troops. The examples of models
which are presented in this paper are for the intended purpose of
illustrating their role in this evolutionary process.
II. MODELS
A model is a representation of reality which abstracts the important
characteristics of the situation relevant to the problem under consideration.
The components of the model may vary from a set of mathematical equations
such as Lanchester's equations, to a war game formulated as a computer
program, to a verbal description of the situation in which analysis and
decision must rely heavily on considered opinion and military judgement
based on experience.
It is not possible for a model to represent all aspects of reality.
However, it must be constructed so that the analyst can clearly under-
stand the inputs, internal operation, and outputs of the system in order
to adequately examine the operations of the system.
A. TYPES OF MODELS
A model is usually developed for a specific study or to solve
some stated problem, and can be classified as one of three basic
types listed in Ref. 3.
1 . Iconic
An iconic model is constructed by scaling and describes
in physical form a dynamic object or a system state at some instant
in time. A sandtable representation of a battle is an iconic model.
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2 , Analogue
An analogue model uses one property to represent another. A
topographic map which uses contour lines to represent altitude is an
example of an analogue model.
3 . Mathematical
A mathematical model of a system consists of a set of
equations whose solutions explain or predict changes in the state of the
system. Models in this category can be refined further into determin-
istic models and stochastic models. Deterministic models represent
systems which are devoid of uncertainty and changes of the state of the
system can definitely be predicted. The original Lanchester equations
are deterministic models in that the output can be predicted with
certainty for any given input. Stochastic models are those which in-
clude probability theory in their representation and in their output.
This type of model has many applications when modeling combat because
of the uncertainty of the situation and, at the same time, may be the
most complicated, and troublesome to work with.
Mathematical models have many advantages over the other types
of models. To develop a formal mathematical model of a situation re-
quires a more thorough analysis of the situation and consequently
results in a greater understanding of the system and a more concise
problem formulation. This tends to make the over -all structure of the
problem more comprehensible, reveals cause-and-effect relationships,
and allows for expansion in an orderly manner.
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A mathematical model is necessarily an abstract representation of
the system which requires approximation and simplifying assumptions if
it is to remain tractable. Yet it is this characteristic that allows mathe-
matical models to be general, responsive to manipulation, and concise
in terms of their output.
B. COMBAT MODELING
The ability to develop a good model of a system or situation is
an art which must be learned through experience. There are no rigorous
steps or sequence of events that an analyst can follow to insure the
development of a model representative of a realistic situation. However,
characteristics of a good model can be included in the one under develop-
ment and areas which are known to be trouble spots can be avoided.
1 . Characteristics of Combat Models
A good facility for or a feeling of being at ease with mathe-
matics and a thorough knowledge of the system being modeled are basic
talents the analyst must possess if one expects to formulate a valid
model.
Generally the process of developing a model will start with
a concept or an idea to be investigated or some specific questions to
be answered. The next phase is accomplished by formulating a repre-
sentation of the concept as a mathematical model, followed by manipu-
lation of the model, analysis of output and refinement perhaps by a
relaxation of assumptions or approximations.
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Experience and judgement must be relied upon when deciding
the relevance of factors to be considered in the model. A thought to keep
in the forefront at all times is to hold the assumptions to a minimum and
insure that the assumptions used are made explicit. A clear statement of
the basis of the operation improves communication between the analyst
and the decision maker and lends credibility to the recommendations.
Combat is not a situation where a static balance of forces
is the primary state of the system. It is a dynamic interaction of numer-
ous elements which include types of weapons, terrain, tactics, force
composition, and personnel, all subject to change over time. A great
deal of the complexity of combat stems from the intricacies of change.
Other than experience itself the use of a model is the most effective
means by which the complicated interactions can be studied in a precise
and reproducible fashion.
The validity of a combat model can be thought of in terms
of its ability to predict. A model of combat situation is difficult at
best to test because experiences in combat are not reproducible and
wars are not conducted for experimental reasons- Some may say that
the Spanish Civil War was an experimental one in that Nazi Germany
tested many of the weapons and tactics which were later used in World
War II; but the situation is not analogous. Such being the case the
most the combat analyst can aim for as stated by E . S. Quade in Ref. 4,
is to seek answers to the following questions:
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Does the model describe correctly and clearly the known
facts of the situation or system?
When the parameters of the model are varied do the results
remain feasible and if not, why not?
Is the model capable of handling special cases in which
there is some indication of what the outcome should be?
Can the model assign causes to known effects?
2 . Difficulties of Combat Modeling
A critique of an analyst's efforts is far easier than starting
from the concept and providing a better alternative. Whereas there is
no sure road to success in developing a model there are several traps to
avoid while traveling this road. Some of the more common pitfalls of
combat models are discussed and the interested reader is referred to
Ref. 4 for a more general and comprehensive coverage.
a. Wrong or Erroneous Assumptions
Faulty assumptions can easily creep into the model
when the analyst does not have a thorough understanding of the capa-
bilities and limitations of the force composition, weapons, or material
that comprise the system or a knowledge of the tactics employed in
various situations
.
b. Inadequate Problem Formulation
The formulation of the problem is the most important
aspect of an operations research project. Failure to adequately allot
the time so that a sufficient amount is spent on deciding what the
problem really is often results in developing a model which gives the
right answers to the wrong problem.
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c. Following the Old School of Thought
This is an adherence to the idea that a particular con-
cept was good enough in the past and there is no reason why it will not
hold again or refusing to venture into new areas because the policy is
against the decision maker. This train of thought is self defeating when
applied to theoretical models .
d. Overconcentration on the Model
The analyst can stumble on this obstacle when one
becomes so engulfed in building a perfect model that is a work of art
or an end in itself and loses sight of seeking a solution to the overall
problem.
e. Complication of the Model
The analyst must decide what is important and
relevant, and proceed to solve the problem. Complicated formulas,
or relationships so involved that attempt to treat every aspect of a com-
plex problem simultaneously are impractical and the inability to reduce
them to an understandable, tractable, expression often results in
conveying little or no meaning. Criticism of the model and attempts to
explain the model lead to additions to try and plug gaps which in turn
compounds the already difficult task of interpretation. All aspects of
combat cannot be treated simultaneously because of the magnitude of
the variables. As the degree of complexity increases so does the errors
and the difficulty of locating them.
15
f.
Incorrect Use of a Model
A model is a device which the analyst uses to assist
in providing recommendations to the decision maker. The output of the
model should not be used as the decision rather than input to the decision
maker. Often times one system may appear far superior to another but
this fact must be considered in its proper perspective by taking into
account the assumptions and limitations of the model. Care must be
taken to avoid using the model output as the final word or as an un-
shakeable basis for an immediate decision.
Most models, although general in nature, are developed
to solve a specific problem and have inherent assumptions and limita-
tions which may be peculiar to the system being studied. The model
cannot be used for a purpose other than which introduced without in-
suring that it is adequate for the new problem.
Modeling combat situations or systems is an effective
method of studying and analyzing military conflict. However, it is not
an end in itself. When the model output has been analyzed and recom-
mendations are made then the military judgement and experience of the
decision maker must play the deciding role. The considered opinion of
the professionals must be called upon when it becomes necessary to
choose among several alternatives when one cause of action does not
clearly stand out above the others.
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HI- THE FIELD ARTILLERY SYSTEM
A preliminary requirement in the formulation of any model is a
thorough knowledge of the system that the analyst is trying to model.
A thorough understanding of the artillery system requires knowledge of
its organizations, the roles or missions that the artillery is called upon
to perform, and the environment in which the artillery conducts operations
A. ROLE OF THE FIELD ARTILLERY SYSTEM
The general role of the field artillery is to:
1 . Provide fire support to the maneuver elements , destroying
or neutralizing those targets that are most likely to hinder the accom-
plishment of their mission.
2. Add depth to the battlefield by attacking reserves, command
posts, logistical installations, and lines of communication.
3. Achieve fire superiority over enemy, mortars, artillery,
and nuclear delivery systems within its area of coverage.
The successful execution of this general role depends upon the
effectiveness with which the artillery system is organized for combat
and assigned specific tactical missions.
The artillery system is organized to deploy and employ particular
fire units such as howitzer, rocket or field artillery missile batteries.
The elements of the system as listed in Ref . 5 are:
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B . THE FIELD ARTILLERY TEAM
The elements of the system that the analyst is most concerned
about for combat modeling are the weapon or firing unit which is commonly
referred to as the firing battery (FB); target acquisition capability which
is most often thought of as a forward observer (FO); and fire control in
the form of the fire direction center (FDC) . These elements are tied
together with communications to form the artillery team as shown in
Figure 1
.
Each member of the artillery team performs a vital function which
enables the artillery to fulfill its role of supporting the manuever
elements. These functions are:
1 . Target Acquisition
The observer (to include all target acquisition devices)
detect and report to the fire direction center, the location and compo-












2 . Fire Control
The fire direction center evaluates the information received
from the observers, determines firing data, and transmits the data to
the fire units.
3. Fire Units
The firing battery applies the firing data to the weapons and
executes the fire mission.
C. MISSIONS OF FIELD ARTILLERY
The artillery performs several specific types of missions with its
role of providing fire support to the maneuver elements. These missions
can be listed under the type of operation the artillery is performing
which are offensive or defensive operations. A knowledge of the mis-
sions within each type enables the analyst to translate the mission to
targets for input to war games or combat models of target acquisition.
1 . Offensive Operations
Some of the typical fire missions that the field artillery is
called upon to execute during offensive operations are:
a. Attack enemy defensive areas (bunkers, base camps)
and emplaced weapons (mortar, artillery and automatic weapon positions).
b. Destroy hostile command and communication instal-
lations such as tunnel complexes and fortified bunkers.
c. Deliver close support fires for maneuver elements and




d. Mass fires on targets during critical movements of
attack to disrupt enemy forces and achieve suppressive effects.
2 . Defensive Operations
Some of the more common fire missions that the field artil-
lery is called upon to execute during defensive operations are:
a. Disrupt, delay, and disorganize the enemy's prep-
aration for attack, by firing on known and suspected enemy positions
and likely avenues of approach into friendly positions.
b. Break up, with final protective concentrations and
barrages, the enemy assault on friendly positions.
c. Limit enemy penetration with fire delivered within
friendly positions and destroy enemy forces that have been canalized
into killing areas .
d. Deny the enemy use of vital roads, railroads,
bridges, mountain passes, etc. , that can be used as approaches to
friendly positions.
e. Support the counter attack and limited offensive
operations such as patrols.
These fire missions listed above cover a wide variety under the
categories of offensive and defensive operations. The Department of
the Army has identified 28 important missions of the artillery which
include 11 fire missions and 17 other missions. These have been
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extracted from Ref . 6 and are listed in Appendix A. The analyst who is
attempting to model the operations of a fire direction center must have a
thorough understanding of these 28 missions.
D. RESPONSE ENVIRONMENT
Field artillery doctrine emphasizes the concept that the field
artillery team must be endowed with a sense of urgency to insure the
timely and accurate delivery of fire to meet the requirements of the
supported units. Any unnecessary delay by any member of the team can
result in the delivery of ineffective fire or the loss of a critical target.
Every effort must be concentrated on the destruction or neutralization of
a target while it is still a target. This fact becomes rather obvious
when a target possesses a high degree of mobility.
In addition to speed , for artillery fire to be effective it must be
of suitable density and must be delivered on target with the proper fuze
and projectile. Around (fuze and projectile) which is effective against
personnel in the open may have little effect against fortified positions
and enemy armor.
Good target acquisition devices and procedures permit delivery of
the most effective fires . Erroneous target location and limited obser-
vation result in greater expenditure of ammunition and less effective
fire. Some type of observation is desirable for every target fired on
to insure effective fire support. Observation of close-in battle areas
is usually visual (air or ground observer) while observation of targets
hidden by terrain features, poor visibility or at great distances can be
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accomplished by electronic (radar, sound) methods . All available means
be used to deliver fire by the most accurate method that time and
the tactical situation will allow* Inaccurate fire wastes ammunition,
alerts the enemy and most of all reduces the confidence of maneuver
elements in their artillery support.
The ultimate objective is to deliver a mass of accurate and timely
fire so that the maximum amount of enemy casualties are inflicted.
E. COMBAT ENVIRONMENT
Artillery is employed and deployed both in width and in depth on
the battlefield to provide the maximum amount of coverage to the sup-
ported forces « As a general rule the light and medium artillery units
will be positioned so that they can accomplish their mission yet are
out of range of the enemy's light artillery. Heavy or long range artillery
units are positioned in depth so that they are out of range of the bulk
of the enemy artillery . The exact positioning of firing units depends
upon factors of which terrain and the actions of the supported units
play a dominant role.
The maximum range of artillery weapons which are most commonly
used to support maneuver elements are listed below from Ref . 7 to
provide an idea of their capabilities.
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115-mm multiple rocket launcher 10,600
Artillery performs its mission of support to the maneuver elements
in many different areas of terrain such as jungle, desert, mountain,
and swamp or marshland. These conditions must be accounted for in
the scenario which is used during war games or a weapons evaluation
study of alternative mixes .
One sided combat, although easier to model, does not allow the
analyst to realistically examine the performance of competing weapons
systems. A unit which is under attack may not function as efficiently
and smoothly as one which experiences little or no enemy counter action
Various states of combat have been included in models by defining an
enemy threat and using scenarios of combat in Europe, Korea, and
Southeast Asia. The levels of combat that have been used in models
are classified as low intensity which is phase III guerrilla warfare,
medium intensity which is combat similar to World War II and Korea,
and high intensity which is nuclear warfare.
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F . THE ANATOMY OF COMBAT
Before examining the areas in which requirements exist for combat
models, it is advantageous to consider some of the elements that com-
prise a battle. Figure 2 is a schematic of an engagement between Blue
Forces (attacking) and Red Forces (defending) . The actions described in
the following general discussion can be visualized with the aid of the
schematic.
The battle begins from the Red Forces point of view when he has
been assigned a defensive mission. The Red commander selects his
defensive positions, establishes liaison with flanking units and issues
orders to subordinates. When the Red forces are in position crew
served weapons such as machine guns, and rocket launchers will be
placed to cover likely enemy avenues of approach and final protective
lines of fire. Anti-tank weapons will be emplaced to cover enemy
armor approaches. Artillery and mortar defensive fires will be planned
to harass and break up Blue forces in assembly areas and to disrupt
any assault before it can reach the defensive positions. Red forces will
dig in, camouflage, and if time permits, lay minefields and protective
wire. The defender forces the enemy to come to him, to meet him on
ground of his own choosing and then selects from several planned
alternatives of fire support as the attackers action requires. The
defensive plan will also provide for local counter-attacks, if necessary.
The Blue force (attacker) begins with reconnaissance to locate










gather as much intelligence about the defender before making an attack,
I if the defense is weak or unprepared then the element of surprise may
the deciding factor. Once the Blue commander has formulated his
plan of maneuver he will add the capabilities of his supporting artillery.
Artillery preparations, to be fired prior to the attack, are planned on
known and suspected defensive positions and weapons. Fires are planned
along the axis of attack to support the attack and provide on-call fires.
The attacking force usually crosses the FEBA with preparatory
artillery being fired to demoralize and destroy the enemy in position,
disrupt the coordination of the defense and neutralize the defender's
indirect fire support. The defenders may reply with counter battery
fire and the result of this duel will be in favor of the most effective
artillery. During this period of preparatory fires the attacker has
moved to an assault line while the defender is firing on these positions.
At this stage the Blue force uses his artillery and direct fire
weapons to neutralize the Red forces small arms, mortars, anti-tank
weapons and artillery while the final assault may be by tanks, by
tanks and infantry, either on foot or mounted in armored personnel
carriers (APCs) , or by dismounted infantry alone. The assaulting
troops keep as close as possible to their own neutralizing tire, which
finally has to shift to permit the final assault of 100 to 200 meters.
The covering fire shifts to block any reinforcement of the position by
the defenders reserve forces.
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The defender in the meantime fires his final protective fires in an
attempt to break up the attack before it can reach his position. If
possible, and in any event when the attackers neutralizing and sup-
pressive fire shifts, the defender fires his crew served and anti-tank
weapons which may be spotted and engaged by the attackers covering
fire, particularly by artillery forward observers or overwatching tanks.
Attacking tanks will fire machine guns and main guns. If a defensive
minefield is encountered, vehicles may be halted from 100-2 00 meters
from the defensive position. From this distance tanks and APCs with
machine guns and grenade launchers will saturate the defensive position,
If an attacking tank reaches the defensive position, it will dominate all
the area in its field of vision and the defense will be broken unless
well dug in. If attacking infantry reaches the defenders position it
will be overrun with some hand-to-hand fighting. Some defenders
surrender, some attempt to withdraw with covering fire, others try to
escape. Those attackers who have overrun the objective can engage
the withdrawing or escaping defenders and along with artillery blocking
fires, cause loser attrition almost without resistance.
If the attackers were beaten back during the assault, they would
suffer additional losses from defenders fire as they withdrew. If the
attack failed during the early stages the loser attrition would be light.
However, if the attack failed at the last moment, loser attrition may
end in annihilation.
28
In the event the attacker takes the defenders position, it is usually
to the defenders advantage to conduct a counter-attack with a reserve
i :ce # supported by planned fire support, before the attacker can con-
solidate his forces and develop his own defense or coordinate his defen-
sive fire support.
All the aspects of a battle have obviously not been covered in this
general discussion. All the phases mentioned may not occur. Some may
be changed with time, or omitted. Battles can be conducted without
armor or artillery. Tactical air support was not considered nor were
nuclear weapons included. Terrain may affect the strength of the de-
fense and hinder or help tactical vehicles. Surprise is a great factor
and a small force can destroy a large force in an ambush. Weather has
been a deciding factor on more than one outcome of a battle. Light
conditions play an important role during the conduct of the battle.
Darkness sharply reduces the mobility of vehicles, practically blinds
direct fire weapons and reduces single shot kill probabilities to almost
zero. Poor visibility is an advantage to the attacker. Short range
weapons such as small arms and rocket launchers have their capabil-
ities degraded less than long range direct fire weapons such as tanks
and recoilless rifles. Observed artillery fire loses some of its effective-
ness in the darkness. Finally the morale, courage, or conduct of the
individual soldier or unit was not considered.
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The analyst cannot possibly hope to include all aspects of combat
in a model and to attempt such a task would be self defeating. However,
the analyst with a feel for the combat situation will start off with a
better than even chance of formulating a model which is representative
of reality.
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IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR MODLi_S
The development of an operational field artillery system is an
evolutionary process . The process will most oiten start with a mathe-
matical model that is theoretical in nature. The analyst can control the
parameters, manipulate the model, interpret and evaluate the output and
hopefully come up with recommendations for future study in areas that
appear feasible and susceptible to change. A theoretical model may
infer, for example, when output is evaluated, that a particular force
composition would increase combat effectiveness. This implication
could further be investigated by incorporating the ideas in a working
model of the operation in a combat situation. This working model may
be an aggregate of several submodels, combined to provide an overall
model for evaluating the effectiveness of alternate force mixes and
assisting in the determination of force composition.
Requirements exist for combat models of the elements of the
field artillery team to assist the artillery in answering the general
questions of how should the artillery be organized; how can the
artillery provide the most effective lire support; and with what weapons
system should the artillery be equipped?
The actual task of developing models for the elements of the
field artillery team cannot be restricted to the forward observer, fire
31
direction center, and firing unit. These specific elements must be
expanded into areas of field artillery operation if maximum benefit is to
be realized from combat modeling.
The operation of the forward observer must be expanded into phases
of target acquisition which is used by the artillery. A great need exists
for valid models of target acquisition systems which will enable the
analyst to evaluate existing systems and develop future systems to in-
crease the detection capability.
Operations of the fire direction center are extended to include
both technical and tactical fire direction. These terms have been de-
fined in the section which discusses fire direction models.
Combat models of firing units are readily extended into the areas
of weapons system evaluation where the problem is to choose optimum
mixes of weapons systems which maximize some effectiveness criteria.
A. THEORETICAL MODELS
The theoretical models discussed herein have been found to be in
agreement with already established facts of warfare. The value of the
models is in intrepretation of their output with the goal that perhaps
the methodology may be applied to specific problems in the field
artillery.
1 . Lanchester Equations
The simultaneous differential equations formulated by
F . W. Lanchester were probably the first attempt at the development
32
of models of combat. A comprehensive paper has been written by
S„ Bonder [Ref. 2] in which he has summarized Lanchester's theories
oi combat in a discussion of the works of analysts concerned with
extensions of the original theory
.
These rather well known basic equations and their solutions
are discussed in Ref. 8 and 9 and presented below as a brief review.
The Square Law is applicable for situations of aimed fire
and is derived under the assumption that:
a . Two forces are engaged in a fire fight when each unit
or each side is within weapon range of all units of the other side.
b„ Units on each side are homogenous but the killing
rate of the opponent for each force may be different.
c. Each firing unit is well aware of the location and
condition of opposing forces so that when a target is killed, fire is
shifted to a new target.
d. Fire is uniformly distributed over the area in which
surviving forces are located.
The opposing forces are designated as odd and even with
the following notation:
x , x = number of surviving units (men) on the even or odd
side at time t.
x , x = initial strength of forces.
p ? ,
= single shot kill probability than an even weapon will
kill an odd man.
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r = rate of fire of even weapons against odd units
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The solution was obtained by integrating over time and equating
results to obtain




































where the ratio of losses squared is indirectly proportional to the effect-
iveness of the weapons. In situations where the Square Law applies
the equations show that concentration of force is advantageous and
warns against almost certain defeat to the side which commits forces
piecemeal.
The Linear Law is applicable for modeling situations in
which area fire is used. The first two assumptions of the Square Law
are used along with the assumptions that
a. Each firing unit is aware only of the general area in
which opposing forces are located and fire into this area without
knowing the results of their fire.
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bo Fire from surviving units is uniformly distributed over
the area in which opposing forces are located,.
The probability of opposing forces killing each other is a
function of areas in the Linear Law, The following notation is included:
A , A = areas in which the odd and even forces are
located
ae. , ae = area of effectiveness (man) of a single shot









= effectiveness coefficient of even against odd.
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The solution was obtained by integrating over time and
equating results to obtain
D X _D X =p X _p V
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The ratio of losses under the Linear Law are indirectly
proportional to the weapons effectiveness coefficients and there is no
advantage to be gained by concentrating forces
.
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The solutions of the Lanchester equations represent average
values. The equations are an example of a deterministic mathematical
model in that the outcome (rate of attrition) directly result from specified
force sizes and kill rates which are the initial conditions.
Lanchester' s Square Law and Linear Law can be modified
by the addition of probability theory. The equations can be applied to
many areas where theoretical and statistical investigations can lead to
useful results. However, the original equations are limited and the
analyst must bear this in mind
.
The areas in which the equations depart from reality are
discussed below. Much work has already been accomplished in extend-
ing the Lanchester equations by relaxing one or more of the assumptions.
The equations assume in general that:
a. Each unit (man) is within range of all enemy units
and that kill probability is constant and not a function of range.
b. All units on both sides are homogenous and therefore
are not considering the fact that opposing forces may consist of in-
fantry, artillery, armor, tactical air, etc.
c. There is no way to incorporate various levels or
intensities of combat into the engagements.
d. No provisions are made for tactical decisions on the
part of the commanders for employment of forces (mobility)
.




There is no way to vary the attrition coefficients over
time.
Herbert K. Weiss has made significant contributions to the
extension of Lanchester equations in models of combat. Reference 9 is
particularly noteworthy because of the treatment that Weiss has given
to relative movement of forces, combat between small forces in the
presence of weapons with large areas of effectiveness and finally combat
among heterogeneous forces. The problem of target assignment is
covered when the forces ar.e heterogeneous.
2 . Examples of Models Using Lanchester Equations
One of the ways in which the original Lanchester equations
depart from reality was that there are no provisions for tactical
decisions by the force commanders. A valid analysis of modern weapon
systems should be made with combat models that provide for tactical
decisions by commanders during protracted combat. Weiss [Ref. 10]
used Lanchester equations for a combat model in a problem which he
formulated as a differential game. The tactic that Weiss has analyzed
is the selection of targets to be attacked. This tactic is incorporated
in his model which includes two forces in contact where each force
consists of a primary and a secondary system. The primary system is
maneuver elements such as infafttry or armor and the secondary system
can be thought of as field artillery or tactical air.
























































_n - <D\ \r V
dt ' ' 34 3
where
x , x = the number of primary weapons (men) for odd and
even at time t
x , x = the number of secondary weapons (artillery air) for
odd and even at time t
kij - rate at which the ith weapon can kill the jth weapon
w
, <p = the fraction of surviving units of the 4 , 3 type
directed at weapons systems of the 1 , 2 type
Optimum tactics are determined, using the above model,
and the effects on force composition are also determined depending
upon the weapon range, cost and performance parameters
.
The problem becomes one of choosing the proper ( ft ,<P )
as a function of time, Weiss makes a further assumption that k rf
k = 0. This is saying that each side's secondary weapon system is
so powerful that it will decide the outcome of the engagement before
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the effect of the primary systems become significant. Weiss solved
this problem by assuming that /and <p , the allocation variables, would
only take on the values or 1 and remain constant until termination of
the battle.
Another application of a differential game of this type is
,
assuming that the game is played optimally, to determine how each side
should divide a given budget between primary (infantry or armor) and
secondary (artillery or air). Given effectiveness coefficients k , k ,
k , k and the unit costs C , C ?/ C , and C . , Weiss determines
the budget ratio s /s that must be maintained to insure a draw and the
fraction of the budget that must be spent on each weapon system.
When weapon characteristics are taken into consideration,
Weiss is able to apply his model with its assumptions and come up with
recommendations for specific weapon types.
Weiss considered the value of supporting weapon system
in the paper. This implies that the weapon system is one that has an
area of effectiveness rather than point effectiveness. However, the
Lanchester equations used in the model are those of the Square Law or
aimed fire. If the Linear Law was used the model would have been too
complex to allow the basic interrelations to be clearly identified. The
model brings out results that can be investigated in greater detail by a
working model in the form of a computer simulation.
Brackney [Ref. 11] in his work has extended the Lanchester
equations to include the concept of search during combat for the
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individual combatants of the opposing force. This development is made
under the assumption that the distribution of a combat force, over an area
id by that force, is uniformly random. The assumptions of Lanchester's
Square Law for area fire are also present. The following is a summary of
Brackney's work.
An M-force opposes an N-force and the rates of attrition
are expressed by:
M-force action N-force action
—
-
= P r M TT = Prn 1dt m m dt mm
r , r = rates at which opposing forces attack each other
m n
m, n = size at any time t of M and N forces
p , p = probability of kill in encounters
.
m n
The reciprocals of the attack rate r and r are expressed
m n
by T and T in the following equations:
m n




T = 1/rn = T + T r
n sn fn
The notations in these equations are:
T , T = the times required by individual M and N
sm sn
combatants respectively, to search for and
find individual enemy combatants (acquisition
times)
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T r , T r = the time required by the respective combatantsfm in
to fire their weapons (engagement times)
The characteristic attack times therefore comprise an acqui-
sition time and an engagement time. The dependence of the acquisition
periods upon the target densities existing over the target areas are
expressed in the following equations:
T = m n ; T = n m (3)
sm sn
n m
The k's are constants of proportionality and the A's refer
to areas occupied by the opposing forces. The acquisition times are
thus taken to be inversely proportional to target densities .
When the expressions (2) and (3) are substituted in (1)
the following expression results for loss rates:
^ = -P M/[k 6i ) + T, ] ;dt m m fm
n
^f = -p M/[k (
A
m ) + T f ] .dt n n — fn
m
Distinctive combat situations can be defined according to
the relation of an individual combatant's search time (acquisition) to
his firing or killing (engagement) time. Brackney considered cases only
where the acquisition time was taken to be negligibly small or alternately
very large compared to engagement time. Although not very realistic,
this treatment simplifies computation. Nine combat situations were de-
fined, using the modified Lanchester equations, and analyzed in light
of ground close combat.
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The target acquisition concept, which was expressed in
explicit mathematical terms in Brackney's model, is essential to an
quate treatment of combat modeling. One of the most important
aspects of combat is to rapidly and accurately acquire information con-
cerning the disposition of enemy forces .
Col. Thomas S. Schreibert [Ref. 12] has developed a model
using differential equations, which enables the efficiency of the intel-
ligence and command and control systems (target acquisition concept)
to be quantitatively related to the fire power and numerical strength of
a force. Numerical results are presented which show that an increase
in the target acquisition capability can be equivalent to a substantial
increase in force strength. This result is intuitively appealing and
implies that the combat effectiveness of a unit can be increased by
improving the target acquisition capability of the unit.
Numerous treatments of Lanchester equations are available
in the literature. The results of the above examples are of sufficient
interest and importance to the field artillery to warrant rigid investigation,
B. WORKING MODELS
The second phase in the evolutionary process of developing an
operational field artillery system may be to pursue the feasible outputs
of the theoretical models by means of a working model. The model can
take the form of a computer simulation, a war game, or explicit mathe-
matical expressions by which present or proposed concepts can be
evaluated.
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1 . Fire Direction
The concept of fire direction as presented in Ref . 7 includes
both tactical and technical fire direction.
Tactical Fire Direction is the exercise of tactical command of
one or more units in the selection of targets for immediate and pre-
planned attack, the designation of units to fire, and the allocation of
ammunition for each mission.
Technical Fire Direction is the conversion of requests for
fire, from any source of acquisition, to appropriate firing data and fire
commands.
The field artillery is constantly striving to improve technical
competence in this vital area so that the maneuver elements can receive
the most accurate and effective fire support available. Interesting
problems are abundant in the area of fire direction which can be structured
and hopefully solved with the aid of a model.
a. Areas for Investigation
A few of the more significant problems are presented
to give an appreciation of their magnitude and varying degrees of
difficulty.
The search for a better registration procedure than the
one presently outlined in FM 6-4 is being considered. A statistical
study of present and proposed methods with regard to comparative
accuracies and number of rounds required would be an essential step.
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Improvements in accuracy can be obtained by bal-
listic cdiy matching the family of projectiles within each caliber. This
would greatly reduce the problems involved in computational procedures,
firing tables, and training. The problem is to determine the increase in
accuracy and resulting costs if this goal is to be obtained.
Probably the most difficult and complicated problem is
the determination of individual factors that contribute to overall weapon
system error. The system accuracy is determined by firing and consists
of the square root of the sum of squares. However, it is not known
which areas, of all those causing errors should be improved and to what
extent from a cost effectiveness standpoint.
b. TACFIRE Effectiveness Evaluation Model
Efforts at improving the fire direction capabilities
have been directed toward automation of the procedures. The greatest
advancement has been the development of The Tactical Fire Direction
System (TACFIRE) by Litton Industries which provides automation of
selected field artillery operational functions. It consists of automatic
data processing equipment and programs used by field artillery operations
and intelligence personnel to support the maneuver elements during the
1970-1980 time frame.
A system effect. tess model was developed by
Litton to evaluate progress in TACFIRE design and to serve as a vehicle
for measuring overall TACFIRE performance.
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A summary of the major components of the model as
discussed in Ref. 13 is presented.
The complete TACFIRE Effectiveness Evaluation Model
(TEEM) is an integrated set of three submodels, each designed for a
particular analytical purpose.
The first submodel, Mission Execution Time Under Load
(METUL) has the function of simulating TACFIRE response under con-
ditions of varying fire mission load and mission mix. The model accepts
technical and tactical inputs which characterize the state of TACFIRE
and generate dynamic mission loads, simulates the processing of
missions, and outputs system response measures such as mission
response time, utilization factors for personnel and equipment and
statistics for selected processing stages.
The analytical model for the Probability of State (AMPS)
was designed to provide a tool for estimating TACFIRE system state
probabilities . The inputs to AMPS are the rates at which components
in TACFIRE go up or down. This submodel provides a capability to obtain
information such as mean-time-in-state, state transition probabilities
and time to restore operations. The primary function of the third submodel,
System Performance Evaluation Criteria (SPEC) , is to convert the output
of METUL and AMPS into measures of TACFIRE effectiveness.
The automation of fire direction procedures and the
development of TACFIRE is a major accomplishment which is going to
effect not only the field artillery team but the entire field artillery system.
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2 . Targe t Acquisition
Improvements in weapon systems and fire direction capabil-
ities have more than kept pace with the development of target acquisition
systems. The conduct and outcome of tactical warfare depends more
heavily than ever before on reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence
The field of target acquisition is rapidly becoming the most
important area in field artillery operations and must be given increased
emphasis. An urgent need exists for valid models to evaluate present
capabilities of detection devices (sensors) and tactics of employment
and to develop improved target acquisition systems.
a. Areas for Investigation
Does the acquisition of targets determine the deploy-
ment of forces or does the employment of forces , during the conduct of
battle, determine the targets to be acquired? A documented answer to
this question has received increased emphasis in light of the mobility
of modern combat and will have a significant effect on the organization
of units for combat.
Models of target acquisition systems must be able to
treat the problem of trade offs between accuracy of target location,
timeliness of acquisition and completeness of acquisition.
Many experienced senior personnel lean toward
accuracy of target location as the critical element. The overall delivery
error of rounds on the target is a function of the errors in target location,
fire direction, weapons system, and ballistics. One method of minimizing
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this overall delivery error is to start at the beginning and minimize the
error of the target location device (sensor) . Therefore the effort should
be placed on the development of sensors.
Timeliness of target acquisition can be presented as
the critical element. Too great a delay in transmitting and processing
target information may result in a lost target. The sense of urgency is
stressed because of the mobility of many targets. If enough firepower
is brought to bear then a target will be destroyed while it is still a
target. This policy, if not used with a great deal of caution, results in
wasting ammunition and may even lead to firing on wrong targets.
Probably the most difficult element of target acqui-
sition to give adequate treatment is completeness of acquisition. This
is the ability of a sensor to detect the size and or composition of a
target. The amount of fire support allocated to effectively engage a
target consisting of one enemy truck, is much less than that required to
engage a convoy of six trucks. The completeness of acquisition directly
relates to the field artillery being able to underkill, kill, or overkill a
target.
There is no answer in closed form that can be given
to solve the problem of trade-offs but adequate treatment must be given
in a combat model of target acquisition systems.
The problem of analyzing how target priorities change
over the conduct of the battle is one in which combat models can assist
in a solution. A standardized method of assigning target priorities is
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of particular importance when applied to war games. The target lists and
priorities have a direct bearing on the result of the game and the interpre-
tation of results
.
The field artillery has expended a great amount of its
resources in an effort to sol. t can be referred to as the detected-
acquired -engaged difference as shown in Figure 4.
The values in Figure 4 are intended to represent a
hypothetical situation of 100 targets detected . Out of the total detected
50 of the targets are located and identified or acquired, and 20 of the
total targets detected are ultimately engaged by field artillery.
The purpose of this example is to illustrate the fact
that not all targets which are detected can be engaged. Some of the
reasons can be determined and every effort is being made to raise the
levels of acquired and engaged to that of detected. When this has been
accomplished the field artillery will be providing the ultimate in fire
support to the maneuver elements.
b. Target Acquisition Model
The target acquisition model that is discussed below
was developed by J. R. Payne [Ref. 1] and associates and is entitled
Combined Reconnaissance,, Surveillance and SJ_GINT Model (CRESS )
.
It is an advanced analytical model of reconnaissance and surveillance
systems suitable for use by U.S. Army agencies engaged in war gaming,
simulation and analysis of alternate target acquisition system, ammuni-















CRESS is a n odel of the operational use of sensor
systems and is composed of three major submodels: CRESS-A for aerial
systems, CRESS-G for ground-based sensor systems, and CRESS-S for
signal intelligence (SIGINT) sensor systems. It is modular in design and
each of the three major submodels may be used independently of the others
to process simulations of target acquisition functions up through Division-
size forces
.
The following types of sensor systems are incorporated
in CRESS:
Photo




Low-light- level television (LLLTV)
Passive night-vision devices (PNVD)
SIGINT
The simulation of the operational use or" any collection of sensors of the
above types produces; the target detection capability, the location
accuracy, and the timeliness of reports as the basic measures of per-
formance of the system. Each of the submodels has a computer program
which performs all of the mathematical calculations. Player personnel
must provide the input in the form of scenario development, target and
sensor deployment, and intelligence a s. Outputs of sensor per-
formance are analyzed, re .1 -d intelligence estimates are made and the
sensors are redeployed for another run.
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CRESS is a definite asset to the field artillery. It can
be used in studies designed to:
a. Compare alternate families of target acquisition
systems
.
b. Test advanced concepts will depend on the target
acquisition capability of a force and
c. To generate target lists as input to an aggregate
model.
3 . Weapons Evaluation
The area of weapons evaluation is the most comprehensive
in field artillery. Adequate evaluation of a weapon system must consider
factors such as hardware, measures of effectiveness, organization of
forces and costs. Lead time and associated costs involved in weapon
system development are increasing at an exponential rate. The field
artillery cannot afford the luxury of using scarce resources to develop
and field a system which will not live up to its intended role. Models
which are capable of evaluating present and proposed weapon systems
are the answer to being right the first time.
The forthcoming introduction of TACFIRE will significantly
increase the fire support capabilities of field artillery and revolutionize
its operations. Such being the case, an urgent need exists to examine
the entire field artillery system to insure that it is equipped, organized,
and trained to fully utilize its capabilities .
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a . Hardware
The evaluation of the hardware or the actual weapon
itself is a responsibility of the Ordnance Corps and the Army Material
Command (AMC) . The field artillery establishes requirements for weapons
based on accuracy, lethality, range, mobility and cost, to mention a few
factors. The joint efforts of the Ordnance Corps and AMC are directed
towards satisfying these requirements. All of the interesting work of
weapons evaluation is by necessity classified. The Office, Chief of
Ordnance publishes a report of the type listed in Ref . 14 every three
years and these can be obtained by the interested reader who desires
to pursue the subject further.
b. Measures of Effectiveness
A model which is designed to evaluate an artillery
weapon system must have some measure against which alternatives
can be compared. The task in choosing a c[ood measure of effectiveness
(MOE) can be most difficult and require a great amount of time and effort
on the part of the analyst. The measures of effectiveness which are
decided upon for a particular study must be understandable and accurate.
Numerous measures have been proposed by analysts who have extensive
knowledge of field artillery operations . A few of the more common
measures of effectiveness are presented. They were developed for use
in a particular model or study of a specific problem and cannot be con-
strued as applicable for all field artillery problems.
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The quantity of ammunition expended by type or by
weight for each weapon mix can be used as a measure of logistical support
required. The number of targets destroyed or total floor space destroyed
by a weapon system is a measure which has been used when working with
incremental effectiveness. Firepower scores have been developed for
various types of weapons and have been used as a MOE. The difficulty
encountered in using firepower scores has been one of trying to equate
the scores of dissimilar weapons. The number of fire missions success-
fully completed is a measure of effectiveness which can easily be obtained
for various mixes and is one of the most obvious .
c. Artillery Weapons Evaluation Model
A model for evaluating field artillery weapons systems
is an aggregate of various submodels. The model developed by Charles
T. Odom [Ref. 15] contained submodels for target acquisition, weapon
deployment, effectiveness computations, and weapon-mission alloca-
tions. The model is designed for use in system analysis studies of
artillery weapons, and was used to form the basic structure of the model
used in the series of REDLEG studies. REDLEG III is the title of the
computer model which was used in the USACDC study Optimum Mix of
Artillery Units 1971-1975 . The major features of the model have been
summarized from Ref. 16 and are presented as an example of an aggregate
model which is used in the evaluation of field artillery weapons mixes.
The major feature of REDLEG III is its ability to con-
sider the time-dependent appearance of fire missions and the capability
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of firing units to complete the missions. The model keeps track of the
status of each firing unit and utilizes only those units which are avail-
able and capable of engaging a current target.
The introduction of the time concept into the model
provides an analytical method for examining the variations of artillery
firepower demands during the course of a battle. When firepower demands
exceed firepower capabilities the artillery is in a surge situation. A
surge situation exists according to Ref. 16 when the number of targets
to be engaged in a short period of time is greater than the number of
targets that the artillery force is capable of effectively attacking.
REDLEG III is shown as a flow chart in Figure 5.
Inputs to the model are targets, other missions to be performed, weapons
mix, and weapon effectiveness for attack of a given target type. The
inputs are combined in a weapon-target allocation routine which assigns
weapons to targets on the basis of effectiveness and fire unit availa-
bility. The basic output of the model is the number of available missions
the artillery force is able to complete successfully. The weight of
ammunition expended and the cost to maintain a capability are secondary
outputs. The specific details of the model are described in relation to
each of the blocks of the flow chart in Ref. 16.
A basic purpose of REDLEG III is to compare the capa-
bility of several weapon mixes to perform the missions required by a
tactical situation. When a mix is specified the analyst can conduct a



















































logistical and command constraints on the capability of the mix. The
experience and military judgement of the analyst must be called upon when
conducting a sensitivity analysis to avoid the problem of examining sit-
uations which are tactically unsound.
The primary output of REDLEG III is the number of
missions successfully completed by a given artillery weapon mix. This
is a measure of the effectiveness for a weapon mix and can be used as
input to a cost-effectiveness study.
The REDLEG III model is a significant improvement
over previous models because of the incorporation of the time concept.
It is a model which is used by USACDC to assist in the determination
of an optimum mix of field artillery weapons. The model is a good rep-
resentation of reality, tractable, flexible and subject to manipulation.
C. UTILIZATION OF COMBAT MODELS
Models of field artillery combat situations probably find their
most extensive use as inputs to overall weapons systems evaluation
and cost-effectiveness studies. The studies are made for example,
to determine; optimum mixes of weapons for future force composition,
to determine ammunition requirements, to determine overall logistical
support requirements for various theaters of operation and also to
determine personnel requirements
.
Models are formulated and used by Department of the Army agencies
for in-house studies. The Office Assistant Chief of Staff Force
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Development, Office Chief of Research and Development, Army Material
Command, Ballistics Research Laboratories, and the Army Combat
Developments Command (CDC) are just a lew of the user agencies. The
CDC appears to be the most extensive user and developer of combat
models. Models are the basic, tool used in the studies conducted by
the Institutes of Strategic Studies, Systems Analysis, Land Combat, and
Combined Arms .
Numerous contracts are let to civilian research and analysis firms
for the purpose of conducting studies or development of models. The
models discussed in this paper, for the most part' were developed in
this manner. The Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) , Combat Opera-
tions Research Group (CORG) , Bunker-Rarno Incorporated, Thompson-
Ramo-Woolridge (TRW) , and Litton Industries are some of the prime
contractors who assist the field artillery and the Army in solving the
problems of how shall the forces be equipped, organized, and employed
in an optimum manner.
58
V. AREA OF FUTURE EMPHASIS
The field artillery has made great advances in improving its fire
direction capability with the development and forthcoming deployment of
TACFIRE. New weapons and munitions have been developed which pro-
vide the commander with the capability of reaching out and destroying
targets almost at will. The structure of our combat forces has been
designed with a flexibility that permits rapid and effective employment
and the associated personnel have been trained to a high state of read-
iness. However, in comparison to these improvements, the field
artillery and the Army as a whole, has lagged in developing its combat
intelligence capability in general and target acquisition capability in
particular.
Future conflicts may not be waged along well defined battle lines
and in cases of unconventional war like the one in Vietnam, target
detection becomes a major problem. In fact, a nation's surveillance
and detection capability may be a key element of survival in nuclear
war.
Target acquisition systems with increased capabilities have been
developed and in many instances, put into the hands of troops. This
advancement is by itself not enough and the fact is well stated by
Lt. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard [Ref. 17] who is a former commander of
the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and former commanding general
U.S. Army Combat Developments Command.
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But equipment alone does not necessarily improve the Army's
capability. Devices used in surveillance and target acquisi-
tion must be matched with doctrine that prescribes their
employment and a capability for processing information that
will rapidly convert raw information into usable intelligence.
The cycle is completed only when the resulting intelligence
is transmitted and displayed to the troops who must engage
the target or the enemy's forces.
Valid models have been developed in the areas of fire direction,
weapons evaluation, and target acquisition. Examples of combat models
which have been used to increase the capability of the field artillery in
these areas were presented. It appears that a state of the art has been
perfected to a fine degree in the first two areas and significant advance-
ments cannot be expected without a major technological breakthrough.
I am not an advocate of bringing progress to a halt in the areas of fire
direction and weapons evaluation. Quite the contrary, for problems
exist in these areas and must be given sufficient attention. I do feel
that the military analysts have a better understanding of the significant
problems in fire direction and weapons evaluation and possess the
capability to come to grips with them and that solutions are within
reach.
It is now time to channel our efforts and direct the emphasis
towards bringing target acquisition capabilities of field artillery into
line with those of fire direction and weapons evaluation.
The Combined Reconnaissance , Surveillance and SIGNET Model
(CRESS ) is a major step forward in the development and employment of
target acquisition systems. Target acquisition is a function in which
the demand, and the development of the capability to satisfy the demand
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constantly stimulate each other and lead to increased capabilities. The
field is unlimited and the gaps that exist can and must be bridged with
improved target acquisition systems that have been analyzed and devel-
oped with the aid of combat models
.
Department of the Army has realized the tremendous role of combat
intelligence and has organized the Surveillance, Target Acquisition and
Night Operations System Office (STANO) for the purpose of increasing
the combat intelligence capability of the Army. The STANO organization
will have members, according to Ref. 18 from the Army General Staff
and command organizations such as the Army Material Command (AMC)
,
Combat Developments Command (CDC) , the Continental Army Command
(CONARC) , Army Security Agency (ASA)
.
Project MASSTER (Mobile Army Sensor System, Test, Evaluation,
and Review) is a part of the STANO organization which will serve under
the four commands; AMC, CDC, CONARC, and ASA, to perform integrated
test and evaluation of STANO items.
STANO will combine systems, personnel, organization and
doctrine in an integrated effort through studies, models, and systems
analysis to insure the best utilization of the Army scarce resources.
The STANO organization has the resources to bring the intelligence
and target acquisition capabilities to a level of advancement that has
been achieved in fire direction and weapons evaluation.
61
APPENDIX A
IMPORTANT MISSIONS OF FIELD ARTILLERY
The twenty-eight important missions of the field artillery have been
'defined by the Department of the Army and are listed below. They con-
sist of eleven fire missions and seventeen other missions. Tables
which identify the personnel, equipment, and processing sequence for
each mission are listed in Ref . 6.
(1) Fire Missions
(a) Battery Fire Direction Center (Btry FDC)
1. Area, Target of Opportunity, DS
2. Precision, Destruction, DS
(b) Battalion Fire Direction Center (Bn FDC)
3. Area, Target of Opportunity , DS
4. Area, Time on Target Fire for Effect (TOT/FFE)
,
DS and GS
5. Precision, High Burst/Center of Impact (HB/CI)
,
DS and GS
6. Precision, Registration, DS and GS
7. Precision, Destruction, DS and GS
8. Fire Mission, Missile Battalion (Msl Bn)
, GS
(c) Division Artillery Fire Direction Center (Div Arty FDC)
9. Fire Mission, Division Artillery
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(d) Division Fire Support Coordination Element (Div F8CE)
10. Fire Mission, Div FSCE
11. Chemical Fire Mission
(2) Other Missions
(a) Battery FDC
12. Situation Report (SITREP)
(b) Battalion FDC
13. Situation Report (SITREP), DS , GS , and
Missile Battalions
15. Survey, DS , GS , and Missile Battalions
17. Meteorological Message (MET), DS
, GS , and
Missile Battalions
19. Artillery Fire Planning, DS Bn
20. Artillery Fire Planning, GS Bn
22. Artillery Target Intelligence (ATI)
(c) Division Artillery FDC
14. Situation Report (SITREP)
16. Survey
18. Meteorological Message (MET)
21. Artillery Fire Planning
23. Artillery Target Intelligence (ATI)
(d) Division FSCE
24. Preliminary Target Analysis (PTA)
25. Nuclear Fire Planning (NFP)
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26. Nuclear Target Analysis (NTA)
27. Fallout Prediction
28. Chemical Fire Planning
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